This paper studies the impact of mortality in the districts/states represented in key congressional groups (i.e. committees, subcommittees, and parties) on the National Institutes of Health 
Introduction
While a vast literature studies the determinants of private investment in medical R&D (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2006) , little is known on the factors that set the priorities of publicly-supported medical research. The total size of the US federal budget for medical research, however, is comparable to 1 its private counterpart. 1 In addition, abundant normative work emphasizes the value of that public investment (e.g. Arrow 1962 , Griliches, Klette and Møen 2000 , and Murphy and Topel 2006 , and supports its high level. 2 This paper presents a positive investigation of the actual use of that investment, through the study of the allocation of National Institutes of Health (NIH) funds across diseases.
My approach relies on the fact that the NIH agenda partly results from congressional bargaining that takes place throughout the Appropriations process of federal funds. This process involves different congressional groups -committees and subcommittees -that serve well defined institutional roles.
I find that congressmen who serve on a single, key, subcommittee, the House Appropriations Subcommittee for Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies (HouS), appear successful in steering NIH funds towards research on disease that affect disproportionately their constituents. This subcommittee, together with the equivalent subcommittee in the Senate, is responsible for designing the proposal for the NIH budget, which will then be discussed by the whole Congress.
Congressional records indeed show that congressmen aim to favor medical research that has higher expected returns in terms of life-years saved. Public funding for research on a disease should therefore reflect the trade-off between the productivity of research on that disease and its impact on mortality.
Mortality due to a disease, however, varies across districts and across states, so that it also varies across congressional groups. I use this heterogeneity to estimate the effect of the distribution of lifeyears lost in the districts/states of any potentially influential group on the distribution of NIH funds across medical conditions. Since the productivity of research on a disease could be correlated with that disease mortality, I use first differenced variables to perform this estimation. The first difference transformation uses the fact that distribution of life-years lost in any congressional group changes every two years, due to the changes in the composition of that group that may follow congressional elections. For that purpose, I use longitudinal data that contain information on mortality for every congressional group and on NIH funds awarded through type R grants, at the disease level or at a finer level of aggregation, over the period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . Type R grants are the most common NIH grants, and support discrete and circumscribed projects, which can be matched to a well-defined disease category, and represent more than half the NIH budget.
Numerically, I find that an increase of 1 percent of life-years lost because of a disease in the districts represented in HouS increases the funds for research on that disease by 0.8-1.1 percent. On average, this effect corresponds to an increase of yearly funds for clinical research equal to around $2300 for every additional life-year lost in the population of the districts represented in HouS. 3 This effect is much larger for clinical research, which, by definition, encompasses any research project that involves human subjects, such as clinical trials, than for basic research, which refers to any other project. Life-years lost in no other committee or subcommittee I consider have any robust effect on the allocation of NIH funds.
These results identify mortality in HouS districts as a determinant of the NIH research agenda, as long as diseases affecting more the constituents of HouS congressmen are not systematically more (or systematically less) promising from a medical research perspective. The assignment of congressmen into Appropriations subcommittees is decided within parties, at the beginning of every term, and based on the list of subcommittees, ranked by order of preference, every congressman already assigned to the Appropriations committees submits to his/her party. Although there is no formal congressional rule governing who should sit in some given sub/committee, I couldn't find any evidence suggesting that congressmen were assigned to HouS based on their constituents' health conditions. In fact, HouS members may not have any distinct interest for the NIH budget, or health issues, since the NIH budget is one among several issues they are in charge of, such as labor or education. Instead, congressmen likely rank subcommittees membership according to the potential share of federal funds such membership would let them supervise. The combination of three factors cause this share to vary across subcommittees: the size of the subcommittees, as well as the number of subcommittees a congressman can be assigned to, are bounded by congressional rules, and the total sum of funds any Appropriations subcommittee supervises is mostly exogenous.
If HouS members indeed derive the same utility from medical research as other representatives on average, the previous estimations show that their greater influence on the NIH agenda results from their membership to HouS in itself. These estimations thus provide an insight on the functioning of Congress. This greater influence could stem from the fact that they design the very first proposal that will be discussed in Congress, as in Baron and Ferejohn 1989 's theory of legislative bargaining, it may also derive from their interactions with the NIH staff or with medical experts their position 3 Unless mentioned otherwise, all the monetary amounts in this paper are in dollars of 2000.
3 involves. If it were not the case, however, those estimations may only reflect heterogeneous preferences for medical research across congressmen. To address this latter concern, I examine the effect of life-years lost in the House majority districts. Due to rules governing the organization of the House Appropriations committees, the share of members of the majority serving on HouS, or on any other Appropriations subcommittee, has to be approximately equal to the share of majority members in the whole House. This institutional feature induces a strong correlation between mortality in HouS and in House majority districts, and, in addition, I estimate that mortality in House majority districts impacts positively the distribution of life-years lost across diseases. This estimation is consistent with the previous results, and is equivalent to using life-years lost in House majority districts as an instrument for life-years lost in HouS. This strong correlation limits the possibility to distinguish the respective of effect of either group, though. To summarize, the affiliation to either HouS or the House majority confers a larger power in the bargaining process on the allocation of NIH funds across diseases. This paper stresses the limits of the independence of publicly-funded medical research from political influence, which is a major objective of the NIH organization. In fact, congressmen (and the President) have full institutional authority over the federal budget for medical research in the US.
Each year, as part of the Appropriations process, they decide on the amount of federal funds allocated to every institute composing the NIH. 4 These institutes are in charge of awarding grants for research on a well-defined set of topics that usually comprises a more or less wide group of pathologies (such as the National Cancer Institute or the National Institute of Dental and Craniofacial Research).
Since the institutional rules governing the budget process do not let congressmen to decide on the amount of funds devoted to a disease directly, but only on the allocation of funds across its institutes, congressmen may only affect their expected distribution of funds across diseases, conditionally on the distribution of funds across these units. To examine this point, I estimate the effect of life-years lost on expected funds by disease and type of research. The results of this estimation confirm the previous ones. Interestingly, the impact of the House majority is larger in these estimations. Although the House majority has a substantial power to influence the allocation of NIH funds towards institutes, 4 Two institutions are in charge of funding medical research, development and training specifically: the NIH and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) agencies. Both have roughly the same budget, but the HHS supports mainly health services and training, whereas the NIH distributes federal funds to research projects on biomedical topics. Their budget far exceeds the budget of any other R&D agency, except for the Department of Defense agencies. For instance, the budget of the National Science Foundation (NSF), which distributes grants to support research in any scientific field, was about $ 3.6 billion in 2000. Source: The American Association for the Advancement of Science guide to R&D funding data, available on http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/guihist.htm HouS thus appears to have more effective means to impact the actual research agenda of the NIH.
Using the same data aggregated at the state level, I then investigate the potential effect of earmarking of NIH funds. I find that the number of representatives from a given state in HouS, or in any other group, has no significant on the sum of funds received by the research institutions located in that state. "Usual pork-barrel", although raised in numerous anecdotes and empirical studies thus seems to have no substantial effect on the allocation of funds across states for the specific type of NIH grants I consider.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next part provides a brief survey of the literature to this paper. The next section inventories the main channels of congressmen's control over the NIH agenda. Section 3 describes the data used for this paper. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy and Section 5 the results of the estimations. Finally, Section 6 discusses the results, focusing on the difference between basic and clinical research, with a model that is the basis of the specification used for the estimations. Productivity of research varies substantially across sources of funding, which is consistent with the fact that motivations other than scientific productivity impact investment decisions. Following the profit incentives hypothesis, Azoulay and Tay 2003 , Cerda 2003 , Acemoglu and Linn 2004 , Lichtenberg and Waldfogel 2009 and Finkelstein 2004 , for instance, show that changes in the (potential) demand for a cure, or for a related good, induce changes in the nature or the volume of pharmaceutical innovations.
Among them, Azoulay and Tay 2003 , Lichtenberg and Waldfogel 2009 and Finkelstein 2004 health decisions or recommendations, regarding drugs for orphan diseases and vaccines, as exogenous shocks on the demand of medical goods to control for the productivity of medical research. This paper investigates the very factors driving public decisions themselves. These factors could be used to understand better the complementarity between public and private research (David, Hall and Toole 2000 , Hall, Mairesse and Mohnen 2010 , Toole 2007 , and their joint effect on medical innovations. The local concerns studied here also differ from the local pork-barrel objectives usually raised in the political economy literature on congressional bargaining. Several studies (e.g. Cohen and Noll 1991 , Ferejohn 1974 , Atlas et al. 1995 and Knight 2005 show how the geographic origin of members of relevant committees affects the geographic allocation of federal funds. This influence has proven useful in explaining other differences across states (e.g. Aghion et al. 2005 or Levitt and Snyder 1997) showing that this effect is limited to centers with relatively little expertise. The bulk of NIH funds traditionally goes to the same small set of universities, which do have expertise in any field, so that, on aggregate, earmarking to local research institutes should have limited consequences. The results here are consistent with that hypothesis, since I find that no substantial pork-barrel at the state level.
Congressional control over the NIH budget
In his memoir The Art and Politics of Science, Harold Varmus, former head of the NIH, mentions that he once received a call from the congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, "asking [him] to add $50 million for the budget for AIDS research. As the representative from one of the districts most heavily affected by the epidemic, her wishes were understand-6 able. Since she was a member of the House Appropriations Subcommittee for the NIH, she was in a position to try to increase funds for AIDS research when the subcommittee was debating the size of the NIH budget."
He later adds that he "declined as politely as [he] could. Sometimes it was not so easy to say no." Regardless of the actual success of such attempts, there are direct ways through which congressmen can control, at least partly, the funding for research on a disease.
Control through the budget formulation
The main channel of congressmen's control on the medical research agenda lies in the formulation of the budget. Every year, the Appropriations committees of both chambers are in charge of designing a budget proposal, based on a budget request from the NIH, that will then be submitted to the whole Congress -the House of Representatives first, the Senate second. 5 The Appropriations bill for the NIH specifies the budget to be received by every institute composing the NIH. These institutes are relatively autonomous units that fund projects on some specific area of scientific research. Some institutes are specifically responsible for supporting research on a single disease or set of diseases (such as the National Cancer Institute, or the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases), whereas others may award grants for basic research on any topic (such as the National Institute of General Medical Sciences) or support projects studying specific technology (such as the National Institute of Biomedical Imaging and Bioengineering). As a result, in several instances, the area of specialization of the institutes and centers overlap, whereas some topics are strictly included in the area of a single institute.
In addition to setting the budget of each institute, the Appropriations bill may also make additional recommendations on how to allocate funds across research topics. An examination of the bills suggests that both research productivity and distributive concerns determine the allocation of the NIH 5 Like the rest of the budget, it is enacted unless it is vetoed by the President. should be the basis for allocating research funding, the Committee understands that other factors are also relevant to NIH's decisions, including such considerations as the infectious nature of a disease, the number of cases and deaths associated with a particular disease, the Federal and other costs of treating a disease, the years of productive life lost due to a particular disease, and the estimated proximity to research breakthroughs. The Committee does not presume to judge which criteria should take precedence in individual funding decisions, but urges NIH to consider the full array of relevant criteria as it constructs its research portfolio."
The bills often specify how the funds might be allocated across topics within the institutes or centers. As in the previous excerpt, the bills often repeat that the NIH has authority on the allocation of funds, yet give precise suggestions for the use of those funds. For instance, the previous report Table 1 presents the list of groups I consider in this study and some information on their role and their size.
Control through the NIH organization
The partition of the NIH itself results from congressional approval, a bill can create or terminate an institute. A bill may also create other forms of autonomous programs, such as centers, to direct funds to any specific area or interest. Between 1950 and 2002, the number of institutes composing the NIH thus increased from 2 to 26. Table 12 
is the true sum of life-years lost to 100 years old among the residents of s sharing the characteristics c, in the year y, because of disease d. 
where m -set of characteristics C 1 ≡ {urban, rural} , -set of characteristics C 2 ≡ {government employee, other},
-set of characteristics C 3 ≡ {black, white, other}.
These partitions are aimed to match information on deceased individuals from the Vital statistics, and information on district composition used to compute w(R, c, s, y) variables, which are provided in Lublin 1997 or Adler 2008 For any group g of n g t congressmen in Congress term t, I define the normalized life-years lost function LY as:
The variable LY g d,t represents the average sum of life-years lost because of disease d in year y, in the district (resp. state) of the representatives (resp. senators) X belonging to the group g in Congress term t (counting twice a state if both its senators belong to g).
Remarks: the previous equations allow the year variable y of the mortality files to differ from the 11 investment in medical research on a disease in a given year decreases mortality due to this disease the following years, changes in mortality from one year to another will be highly correlated across groups, assuming groups are not too different from the US population. This correlation will create collinearity across the first-difference of life years lost variables, which could bias the estimation of the coefficients. In fact, since the change in mortality in any group would then be correlated with virtually any sample of US residents that is close enough to the whole population, the estimation would suffer from omitted-variable bias.
In practice, using mortality data from 1989 or from some other year shouldn't change the results of the estimations, since the distribution of mortality across states and diseases has been extremely stable over time. 9 However, I chose 1989 because Vital statistics before that year do not provide as detailed information on the ethnicity of the deceased, which I use to compute life-years lost at the district level. 
Data on NIH grants
The second set of data derives from detailed information on R01 grants at the grant level provided in various NIH databases: the REsearch Portfolio Online Reporting Tools (REPORT) and the NIH data supplied by the NBER (Lichtenberg 2001) for the period 1986-1991. 10 I use these data to gather the following information for every competing "type R" grant: the fiscal year the grant was awarded (which is by definition one year after the budget is voted on), the total amount of funds received by the grantee for the whole length of the grant, the state where the research institution of the grantee is located, the specific agency within the NIH awarding the grant and a set of keywords describing the research project funded by the grant. "Type R", and especially R01, is by far the most common type of grant. The NIH documentation, available on http://grants.nih.gov/grants/funding/r01.htm, mentions: "The Research Project Grant (R01) is the original and historically oldest grant mechanism used by NIH. The R01 provides support for health-related research and development based on the mission of the NIH. [...] The Research Project (R01) grant is an award made to support a discrete, specified, circumscribed project to be performed by the named investigator(s) in an area representing the investigator's specific interest and competencies, based on the mission of the NIH." Matching other grants to disease categories is much harder, since they either cover too many different topics, or no specific topic.
The keywords describing a grant mention whether the research hereby funded involved human subjects. I define such research as clinical, and the other projects as basic.
When possible, I also match every grant to a unique disease in the set of disease or disease categories retained here (see Table 13 ). The matching is not possible for some grants that support research on sets of conditions that are too large to be matched with a unique disease (e.g. pathology), or that are related to non-lethal conditions (e.g. back injury). 11 Finally, due to missing information, some grants cannot be matched to a US state.
For the purpose of this paper, I aggregated these data so as to obtain the total amount of funds awarded by disease, by type of research and by Congress term (and by state, for some specifications). I also use series of appropriations aggregated by institute (available on the http://www.nih.gov/about/almanac/appr for some additional results.
Remark. Table 13 4 Empirical Strategy
Specification
Consider a group g of interest, LY d,t the share of life-years lost due to disease d in the districts represented in the group g at t, formally defined in equation 3. 12 The objective of the empirical part is to estimate the effect of these two variables on the allocation of public funds for medical research.
It relies on the specification:
where For some additional results, I also use a finest level of aggregation to estimate a linear model of the form:
where 
Identification assumptions
The first objective of this paper is to identify non-scientific factors affecting the funding of publiclyfunded medical research. The factors studied here, life-years lost across diseases in some congressional group, result from the recomposition of that group following Congressional elections, every two years.
Hence, the identification holds if the selection of members of that group is not based on a systematically higher (or systematically lower) productivity of research on the diseases affecting disproportionately their constituents (Assumption 1).
The coefficients β and β Clinic also provide information on the balance of powers in Congress under the additional identification assumption that, on average, members of a given group do not derive a larger utility from medical research funding than other congressmen (Assumption 2). In other words, members of that group are not "preference outliers". If this assumption fails, a positive coefficient β (or β Clinic ) may just stem from the fact that the NIH budget reflects current Congressmen's preferences. If this assumption holds, a positive β would indicate that members of that group have a larger bargaining power on the allocation of NIH funds, a larger bargaining power they obtain through their membership to that group. Do Assumptions 1 and/or 2 hold? Let's consider majority groups of either chamber first. The affiliation of a congressman to the majority party is a direct consequence of congressional elections. If they are elected, members of any party may a priori take part in any debate regarding the budget, not only the NIH budget. Since the timing of elections is exogenous, and medical research priorities have never been a theme of congressional electoral debates, the recomposition of these groups should be independent of medical research concerns. Assumptions 1 and 2 should thus hold for these groups. 13
Let's now consider the Appropriations committees and subcommittees. Frisch and Kelly 2006 or Schneider 2007 describe the procedures leading to the composition of these groups: following each election, the distribution of committee affiliations is decided within each party, after each congressman has submitted the list of committees, ranked by order of preferences. The distribution of subcommit-tee seats follows a similar procedure. No congressional rule imposes any constraint on the matching between preferences and groups memberships and, in practice, a congressman's assignment to a sub/committee will depend on her/his preferences and clout at the time of the process. In particular, no feature of the membership process indicates that Assumption 1 fails for any of the sub/committees I consider here, and I could not find any congressional document, or any feature of the affiliation process, suggesting that the composition of these groups were linked to research productivity factors.
Given that sub/committees members have specific areas of specialization, Assumption 2 may be more questionable for these groups. Members of both subcommittees (in the House and in the Senate), however -and even more so the whole Appropriations committees -are in charge of several types of spending besides the NIH budget, such as education or labor issues. In addition, congressional rules limit the number of committees and subcommittees a congressman may belong to, as well as the number of members of Appropriations subcommittees. In addition, the total discretionary budget that any budget authority agency will be in charge of seems mostly exogenous, heterogeneous across agencies, and roughly stable over the period studied from the information on discretionary spending provided in Tables 5.1 to 5.6 available on http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals/. These three last facts combined suggest that any congressman can assess the expected share of federal funds that membership to any subcommittee he or she will have authority over, and may rank subcommittees according to that share. 14 The variety of issues falling under the responsibility of the members of HouS and its Senate counterpart, and the heterogeneity of budget sets across Appropriations subcommittees thus support Assumption 2 for these groups. To my knowledge, no study of the selection of congressmen into the subcommittees indicates that its members have any distinct interest for medical research priorities. (As a robustness check though, I perform an instrumental variable analysis to relax Assumption 2 for HouS. The instrument is contingent to the results of the estimations so that, to simplify the presentation, I report the discussion of this approach to the next section).
Some other factors, inherent to the construction of the life-years lost variables, may also bias the estimations and were discussed in the section 3.1. I will use the set of characteristics C3 of section 3.1 to compute life-years lost at the district level for the first estimations in the next section, then perform these same estimations using the two other possible life-years lost.
Results

Allocation of funds across diseases
This section focuses on the impact of life-years lost across diseases and groups on the allocation of funds across diseases, i.e. on the estimation of the coefficients β and β Clinic of equations 4 for the set of groups of table 1.
Regressions at the disease, type of research level. Regressions at the disease, type of research and state level. The previous specifications fit best the actual formulation of the budget described in section 2. However, as a robustness check, I estimate the parameters of equation 5 in Table 4 , with robust standard errors clustered by disease, type of research and state. 16 These estimations confirm the effect of life-years lost in districts of HouS members on clinical research and the absence of effect of this group on the funds for basic research.
This effect is robust to the inclusion of variables N s,t , which control for the potential earmarking of research funds to the representatives' states. (The estimated coefficients of N s,t are reported later for clarity.) The information provided by this regression suffers from the fact that the amount of research across states is extremely heterogeneous, however. This heterogeneity likely explains the negative coefficient of life-years lost in the House Appropriations committee. In fact, the effect of any group, other
15 The small size of the sample and the correlation between life-years lost variables would limit the interpretation of a regression including all life-years lost variables at once.
16 As mentioned in the Section 3, I assume that the missing observations (less than 200 out of 10400) result from missing information on the amount of funds for research on a given disease of a given type in a given state. A Tobit estimation would give similar results.
than HouS, disappears when I use the level of funds (in $ millions), as the dependent variable, and average life-years lost as defined in equation 3, and not the Log of these variables, in the estimation of equation 5 ( Table 5 ). Given that HouS contains around 14 members, and that data are aggregated by Congress terms (that is two years), columns 1,2 or 3 in Table 5 show that an additional life-year lost due to a disease in HouS leads to an increase of NIH funds by year for clinical research on that disease equal to around 6.4×10 6 2×14×100 $2300 by year.
Measurement error of life-years lost variables. Table 6 reports the result of the regression in first differences of variants of equation 4 for the three different estimations of life-years lost at the district level defined by the set of characteristics C1, C2 or C3, used to partition Vital statistics data (see section 3.1). For ease of comparison, I report the results for all three possible measures of life-years lost (so that column (9) in Table 6 and column (5) of Table 3 are the same).
The estimations of columns with most controls show that the effect of HouS is more robust to changes in the method used to compute life-years lost than the effect of House majority, although life-years lost in the House majority may have both an impact on basic and clinical research. Overall, all estimations are consistent with the previous results. No coefficient is significantly negative. These results support the hypothesis that measurement error induced by the lack of mortality data at the district level biases the effect of life-years lost in either group on the NIH budget towards zero.
Whose bargaining power is it? If Assumption 2 does not hold for HouS congressmen, interpreting the impact of life-years lost in HouS as evidence of bargaining power of its members is questionable. Assumption 2 more likely holds for the composition of the House majority, which also has an effect on NIH funds. Both variables may be correlated, however, since congressional rules prescribe the share of majority members in HouS to approximate the share of majority members in the whole House.
The correlations reported in columns (1), (4) and (7) of Table 7 , controlling for Congress terms, show that it is indeed the case. In fact, the more correlated they are, the more significant the effect of House majority life-years lost variable is. For completeness, I also report the second stage of the SLS estimation that uses the first difference of life-years lost in House majority districts as an instrument for life-years lost in HouS districts (although columns (2),(5) and (8) are essentially the same as columns (2),(5) and (8) of Table 6 ).
To summarize, life-years lost in the districts represented in HouS districts have a significant and robust impact on the allocation of funds across diseases, more so for clinical than for basic research.
This impact stems from some additional bargaining power congressmen obtain from belonging to either HouS, the majority of the House or any of these groups.
Counterfactual estimation Which diseases benefited from the 1995 majority change? To address this question, I use the estimated coefficients of Column (4) in Table 3 to estimate the average yearly allocation of funds across diseases after 1994 if majority had not changed in 1994. The results are presented in Table 8 . I find that the majority change mainly affected negatively funding on HIV and Congenital disorders, and affected positively funding for research on Central Nervous System disorders, Psychiatric conditions, and Respiratory disorders. Table 9 reports the estimations of the coefficients ρ and ρ Clinic of equation 5 and some variants.
Allocation of funds across states
The number of representatives of a state in HouS shows no significant positive effect on the research funds for that state, regardless of whether other groups' variables are included in the regressions. (In fact, it seems to have a negative impact on the funds by state; this result, however, is not robust to the inclusion of additional controls). No group seems to have any significant positive effect on the distribution of funds across states. These results do not imply that earmarking does not exist at allin fact some empirical studies and anecdotal evidence suggest the opposite -but they suggest that pork-barrel either affects the redistribution within states or involves relatively small amounts of funds.
The lack of any significant effect is quite surprising nevertheless, especially for the specifications that do not include the social cost variables (e.g. Column 1 of 
where X d,θ,s,t may include dummy variables for every Congress term, type of research, disease and state, and the interactions between the type of research and other dummy variables. The results (see Table 10 ) do show some significant impact of life-years lost on research funds at the state level, but this impact is not significant once additional control variables are included. In fact, the figure 2, which represents the normalized log of funds with respect to the normalized log of life-years lost for every state shows that no correlation is visible for most diseases.
Discussion
What causes a group's bargaining power?
As was demonstrated in the seminal paper of Baron and Ferejohn 1989 , and confirmed in the empirical work of Knight 2005 , being the proposer provides bargaining power, if congressmen are impatient, when the issue at stake is the distribution of some budget across states or districts. Among the groups I consider, the actual proposer is indeed HouS. Its Senate equivalent also participates to the design of the proposal, but its members by definition do not participate to the initial vote of the budget, which occurs in the House. Similarly, the composition of the Senate Appropriations subcommittee on Labor and Health can make recommendations, which are non-binding, and do not seem to steer funds towards diseases affecting more their constituents.
In addition to these theoretical arguments, the quotation from Varmus 2009 also suggests that HouS members may tend more to contact directly the NIH staff, whom they should meet more often than the rest of Congress due to their role in the Appropriations process. Apart from access to NIH staff, HouS members may also have a better understanding of how the allocation of funds across institutes or autonomous programs will impact actual funding by disease.
Why is the effect on clinical research larger?
By definition, clinical research is more applied and, as such, should lead faster to pharmaceutical innovations. In addition, the probability that some investment in research on a given disease indeed leads to some discovery on this disease, and not on another one, may be larger for clinical than basic research. However, these arguments could explain why congressmen prefer clinical to basic research, not why they seem less prone to influence the allocation of funds for basic research than for clinical research.
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The lack of influence of congressmen could instead stem from the fact that the productivity of clinical research may be more easily estimated by non-specialists of medical research than basic research. This difference derives from the complexity of scientific knowledge as well as from the legal restrictions that bind the uncertainty of clinical research, which, by definition, uses human data. If congressmen' s information on basic research is poor enough, they should delegate the allocation of these funds to the NIH staff, who shares congressmen's concern for research productivity, but has no reason to take into account the specific health conditions of powerful congressmen's electorate. 17 I develop this hypothesis in a model presented in Appendix. An extended version of this model is the basis for the specification of the empirical part.
Although the model is substantially different from Aghion and Tirole 1997, to fit the specific question of this paper, proposition 1 raises a similar point: congressmen's authority on the distribution of funds for basic research is formal. Due to their lack of information on the productivity of this type of research, they prefer to delegate the allocation decision to the NIH. Anecdotal evidence from the description of the NIH organization also supports that hypothesis: the explicit mission of one agency, the National Institute of General Medical Sciences, is to fund basic research on any disease. The allocation of the budget of this agency across diseases is thus effectively delegated to its staff. 18 As argued by Foucault 1963 , political authority influences the focus of medical research, at least through the funding of this research. However, the concern for scientific productivity limits the effect of this authority on basic research.
Channel of congressmen's influence
According to the rules of the budget procedure, the unique channel of congressmen's influence lies in their authority over the allocation of funds across the NIH autonomous units (in addition to the possibility to create such units, which rarely occur in comparison to the yearly Appropriations process).
If their preferences indeed depend on the distribution of funds across diseases (and type of research), they then have only the possibility to maximize their expected utility knowing the distribution of funds across those autonomous units. 
where F i,t is the amount of funds allocated to institute i of the NIH at t, and X d,θ,t potential additional controls, and then use the predicted valuelog
Since the size of the sample is small in comparison to the number of NIH units, the predicted value will be so close to the actual value of log F d,θ,t that the results of the estimation of the coefficients of 4 will be essentially the same as in Table 6 . 20
The other method is to compute first the average share of funds by disease and by type of research
composing the NIH for the years preceding the Congress term t, where F d,θ,i,y is the amount of R grants awarded in year y to research on disease d and type θ by
, that is I approximate the expected log of funds with the log of expected funds. The results of the estimation of equation 4 using this latter method are shown in Table 11 . Although they should be interpreted in regard of the lack of any obvious way to know how congressmen form their expectations about NIH funds, these estimations strongly support the hypothesis that the House majority members try to steer NIH funds towards diseases that affect more their constituents through the possibility to direct funds towards NIH autonomous units, whereas the smaller (yet significant) coefficients of HouS life-years lost suggest that HouS members may have more effective ways to influence the NIH budget than this channel.
Conclusion
This paper finds that the social cost of a disease, measured in life-years lost, on the constituents represented either in the majority party of the House or in the subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee in charge of health issues has a positive impact on the NIH funds for clinical research 19 These budgets thus include both funds that will be awarded through type R grants, and other types of spending. 20 In fact, the model is even over-identified if I estimate 7 aggregating observations at the Congress term level. Instead, I thus estimate it aggregating NIH funds at the year level.
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on that disease awarded through R grants. In addition, there is no significant effect of the state origin of the members of these groups on the allocation of funds across states.
The main channel of influence of congressmen over the medical research agenda relies on their control of the allocation of funds across the multiple units composing the NIH. This paper thus shows that the change in the rules that govern the rules of formulation of the budget would limit congressmen's influence. A more radical approach would be to reduce the number of these units. Notes: The x-axis represents the difference between the log of the share of life-years lost in the districts represented in the House majority before and after the 1995 majority change in the House. The y-axis is the difference in log of funds. The full name of diseases is reported in Table 13 . 
(8)
(10) 
(8) (1)
(8) for life-years lost in HouS, separately for each estimation of the life-years lost variable at the district level. C1, C2 and C3 refer to the set of characteristics used to compute that variable (see section 3.1). Columns (1), (4) and (7) Table 11 : Life-years lost and expected NIH funds
(8) 
Appendix
This section presents a simple static model that aims to formalize the description of the NIH budget process. Let K denote the set of "research categories" partitioning the NIH budget. For instance, K could be the set of diseases, the set of research institutes, the combination of both, or any other set relevant for the classification of research projects. For any research category k ∈ K, the level of public investment
where γ ∈ (0, 1) and the productivity factor a k is independently drawn from a random variable with density g k (a k ), with a support in R + .
Agents and Information
Let C be the set of legislators deciding on the distribution of funds F k ∈ R + , and N , an additional agent that is not part of C. The set C may be part or the whole Congress, and may include the President. I assume that the members of C do not know a k , whereas N does. In addition, I assume that C has the possibility to delegate the allocation of a chosen amount of funds into the categories of a chosen subset M of K to the NIH N , and decides of the amount of funds for the other categories
Preferences
The utility an agent i ∈ C ∪ {N } derives from the allocation ((F k ) k∈K is:
where ∀k ∈ K, A i k > 0, λ > 0. I assume that, at the end of the budget process, the allocation of funds maximizes a weighted average utility of the members of C:
with i∈C w i = 1. The allocation of funds across research categories thus solves the following problem:
where: F L ≡ (F k ) k∈L for any L ⊂ K and g ≡ (g k ) k∈K . A solution to that problem always exists, since a solution of the sub-problem defined by adding the constraint L = L 0 to the problem 10 has a solution for any L 0 ⊆ K, and there is a finite number of such subsets. The solution need not be unique, however. Let F * , L * , F * L * ∈ R + × 2 K × R + #L * denote a solution of the previous program.
Proposition 1. Let K ≡ {1, ...., n} the set of research categories, g k (a), the probability density function of the productivity factor a k , and assume that g 2 second-order dominates g 1 and B i 1 = B i 2 , for 
44 V (0) is C's utility achieved at the solution F * , L * , F * L * , and V (1) is the utility that would be achieved if 1 and 2 were swapped, every other variable chosen by C remaining unchanged (note that the expected allocation of funds across the research categories of K \ (L * ∪ {2}) by N is then the same before and after the swap). The first-order conditions of N 's problem impose, for any k ∈ {α} ∪ K \ (L * ∪ {2}):
so that:
is nonnegative since the function c α → c αF γ α is convex and g 2 second-order dominates g 1 . V is nondecreasing in δ, V (0) ≤ V (1), so that the solution defined by the swap of 1 and 2 is indeed an optimum of C's maximization problem, in which 2 is not delegated.
The proposition states that C is more likely to delegate the allocation of funds across research categories about which it has less precise information. The intuition for this result is similar to Aghion and Tirole 1997's distinction of forlam versus real authority.
Clinical research is more applied than basic research, and its potential outcomes are bounded by the law due to its use of human data. Congressmen should thus have a more precise information about clinical than basic research productivity. Prop 1 in this context thus implies that they will be more likely to delegate the allocation decision of basic research funds to the NIH. Notes: columns 1 to 4 report the total number of deaths (in thousands), and normalized log of life-years lost in the US in 1989, and the average normalized log of life-years lost in the House Appropriations Subcommittee for the NIH, and in the House Majority for the whole period over the period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] , as defined in equation 3. CNS comprises any nervous system disorder, Infectious includes any infection that is not sexually transmitted, HIV comprises sexually-transmitted infections, Endocrine comprises diabetes as well as other endocrine and metabolic disorders, Blood/Lymphatic comprises blood/lymphatic cancers only, Psychiatric comprises mainly self-destructive behavioral disorders, Congenital comprises congenital and developmental disorders. The funds are the NIH funds awarded through R grants in the period 1985-2002. 
